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Abstract 
 
Disruptive changes are impacting the electric utility industry worldwide as an increasing amount 
of renewably generated electricity contributes to grid supply to combat negative environmental 
impacts of traditional electricity production. The U.S. utility companies are protected natural 
monopolies faced with an increasing power generation competition and decreasing revenue as a 
result. As the industry transitions over the coming decade, the ability to thrive will be dependent 
upon the incumbents’ ability to adapt while continuing to grow existing technological 
competencies. How to further promote renewable energies in the monopoly market and how can 
the U.S. electric utilities successfully adapt in such an environment are the main research 
questions this thesis attempts to answer. Based on literature review, five specific questions were 
developed and then investigated using the case study on a uniquely innovative leader in the utility 
industry--Green Mountain Power of Vermont. Results show that a natural monopoly can be 
effective in promoting sustainable innovations given the right environment. Among the many 
factors that influence the adoption of sustainable innovations in a natural monopoly market, 
regulation plays a critical role. Incumbents with a corporate culture which enables strategic 
change, and those able to incorporate sustainable innovations into their business model will be 
less likely to be disrupted by the changes occurring in the market. Monopoly incumbents 
recognizing and pursuing new market opportunities arising out of sustainable innovations, rather 
than viewing the change as disruptive, will be more likely to contribute to the successful diffusion 
of such innovation.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The climate is changing rapidly as a result of the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
[1]. The most significant source of global greenhouse gas emissions is the production of electricity 
from fossil fuels [2]. Even if all emissions were to immediately halt, global temperatures are 
predicted to rise by at least 1.5oC [1]. Electricity production in the U.S. made up 35% of total CO2 
emissions in 2016, with 98% of those emissions derived from coal (68%) and natural gas (30%) 
[3]. Meanwhile, the world’s total electricity consumption is projected to rise an average of 1.9% per 
year in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 
2015 and 2040, with growth fueled in part by a transition from fossil-fuel based locomotion to 
electric vehicles [4].  
 
The urgency of transitioning to a sustainable means of electricity production requires the rapid 
adoption and diffusion of sustainable technological solutions. The adoption of these solutions could 
be a critical component in preventing extreme climate change [5]. Renewable distributed 
generation is a modern technological solution to traditional polluting electrical power production 
that could be rapidly adopted. And yet despite significant double-digit growth over the past few 
years relative to its starting point, renewable energy (RE) still only comprises a small portion of 
worldwide electricity supply [4]. The integration of renewables into existing grids will be required in 
order to achieve the high level of integration forecasted – and reduce carbon emissions to avert 
the increasing impacts of climate change.  
 
The incorporation of renewable energy into the electric grid is a unique disruptive situation – 
unlike a more typical disruptive technology, in and of itself, solar energy and other renewables will 
not eliminate a customer’s need for the grid, or at least some other source of power that can 
provide for electricity needs during periods of clouds, night, or lack of wind. Yet the nature 
specifically of solar in facilitating independent consumer possession of power plants will transform 
the utility grid and the interactions of utilities and their customers. As with any disruptive 
innovation, incumbent utilities fight competition through preventing integration, creating hurdles 
for interconnection, lobbying policymakers, or through other mechanisms.  
 
Due to regulatory and technological changes which continue to increase renewable competition on 
the grid while lowering per capita demand for utility-produced energy, electric utilities are facing a 
disruptive transition that will change the way in which they operate. It is well established in the 
literature that many incumbent firms have failed to react appropriately in the face of innovation. 
History demonstrates that some incumbents are able to adapt, while others decline and die. 
Christensen discusses the following reasons: companies follow their own value network, 
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companies fail to anticipate new technological innovations, and companies ignore new entrants 
[6].  
 
A few utilities, however, are proactively preparing for the paradigm shift, and thoughtfully adapting 
in order to continue to be relevant. This work reflects on a unique electric utility taking an active 
role in innovating as a potential example to others. For utilities interested in self-preservation, 
understanding how best to adapt to their changing market is critical. 
 
The adoption of renewable energy into the existing electricity grid presents a variety of challenges, 
ranging from policy to social to technical issues. In the U.S., 100% of U.S. residents is considered 
to have access to grid electricity [7], so practically speaking no one is outside of the reach of the 
utility electric grid. Historically the central electric grid as well as the generation and distribution 
system is controlled by utilities, and utilities organized as Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) provide 
electricity to the majority (73%) of the U.S. population [8]. Therefore, the barriers to diffusion 
focused on for this paper are those resulting from the IOUs.  
 
Many articles discuss the energy transition occurring worldwide [9] [10], and there is extensive 
research examining successful and unsuccessful reactions of companies during periods of 
transition [6] [11]. There is very little research examining the adoption and diffusion of sustainable 
innovations by monopolies. Having identified key barriers to the diffusion of the specific 
innovation of renewable energy, this thesis focuses on the entity with the most potential to act as 
a driver or barrier to the rapid diffusion of solar energy: monopolistic investor owned utilities, as 
owners and operators of the distribution channel. This thesis investigates unique factors 
impacting the adoption of sustainable innovations, and innovation in monopoly markets.  
 
Section 2 includes a literature survey of the diffusion of innovation as well as the diffusion of 
sustainable innovations including unique barriers, and innovation in monopoly markets. Section 3 
details five research questions generated based on literature review, which are later investigated 
in section 4 through  a case study on  Green Mountain Power of Vermont. Section 5 provides a 
conclusion.   
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2.0 Literature Survey 
2.1 The Diffusion of Sustainable Innovations  
Distinct from invention, innovation implies market success which requires making and taking 
opportunities. There is significant interest in innovations, since adoption of innovations directly 
impact a company’s success [12]. Investments in innovations have shown more than 50% social 
rate of return, and about 25% financial rate of return [13]. The life cycle of innovation follows a 
predictable pattern in the marketplace from early problems as the technology is being developed, 
to the emergence of a dominant design as the technology itself evolves less but manufacturing 
and other processes are still improving, and ultimately leads to replacement as new superior 
technologies emerge. The idea, or invention, is only one small part of the life cycle, at the very 
beginning of a long road to innovation. Many innovations succeed, while many ideas die. 
Consumer demand, technical feasibility, economic and engineering practicability, needed 
resources available to develop the technology, and the initiative to pull everything together are 
forces frequently present in successful commercialization of innovations [14]. Opportunities for 
new innovations arise when gaps occur in markets, caused by changing customer preferences, 
advancing technologies, altering government policies, etc.  
 
With respect to speed of diffusion, Rogers described the trajectory of an innovation adopted in 
society as following an S-curve, with the innovation taking off slowly, gaining momentum, 
maturing, decelerating, and eventually being discontinued. This framework can be strategically 
helpful for organizational decision-makers [15]. In terms of the distribution of adopters in society, 
Rogers presented the notion that the distribution of the diffusion of innovations occur according to 
a normal-distribution bell curve. According to Rogers, of all adopters, 2.5% are the first to adopt 
and willing to accept some flaws and/or greater expense, known as Innovators. The next set of 
adopters, consisting of 13.5% of the total adopters, are still willing to accept some product 
limitations given the set of advantages offered over other products in the marketplace and help to 
spread the technology throughout their social network. Early majority adopters consist of 34% of 
the total and come on board once the innovation has been through multiple iterations and 
advances, and having deliberated about the innovation. Late majority adopters comprise 34%, 
and finally the laggards, making up 16% of the total, decide to adopt the innovation [16] [17]. 
Figure 1 below depicts the adoption curves described in the Rogers model.  
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Figure 1: Adoption S-curve trajectory vs. Adopter Categories [18] 
Broadly, the diffusion of innovation and the speed of that diffusion are impacted by several key 
factors, including:  
1. The new product offers comparative advantages over an existing product.  
2. The new product is compatible with existing cultural norms. 
3. The new product is readily understood by users (complexity). 
4. The new product can be easily tested and tried. 
5. The new product has apparent and observable benefits [19]. 
 
The same factors that impact innovation listed above similarly contribute to the diffusion of 
sustainable innovations. Of particular impact in the adoption of sustainable innovations are 
compatibility with existing cultural norms and user acceptance. Sustainable innovations that 
require broader cultural change, or are closely linked to other activities, take much longer to 
diffuse or may not achieve diffusion [20]. 
 
Sustainable innovations are a specific sort of innovation, with similar key factors influencing the 
speed of the diffusion, yet with distinct barriers and advantages to adoption. According to Albert 
Little, “‘sustainability-driven’ innovation means the creation of new market space, products & 
services or processes driven by social, environmental or sustainability issues” [21]. Pursuit of 
sustainable innovations could lead a firm to discover new business opportunities, to offer 
products or services that are beneficial to both the company and society, and to enter into 
business offerings with increased endurance, by definition. The survey of 40 technology firms in 
2004 representing Japan, the U.S., and Europe in Little’s study found that 95% of businesses 
believe sustainability-driven innovation will likely deliver business value, while almost 25% were 
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certain it would produce business value. The potential value sustainable innovations delivers 
goes beyond direct revenue, as it further serves to enhance reputation and brand value according 
to 80-90% of the surveyed companies [21]. 
 
There are of course challenges to incorporating sustainable innovations into a firms’ business 
model. As identified by Long et al., barriers include economic, regulatory, psychological, 
organizational, market, and social. Firms are often hampered in adopting sustainable innovations 
by their own internal business processes [5]. In order to be successful at deploying sustainable 
innovations, a company must behave differently, including leadership, company principles and 
processes, collaboration, and focus on the customer [21].  
 
The primary barrier identified for the adoption of sustainable innovations inside a company is that 
it would require a change in the corporate mindset [22]. The same high barriers are encountered 
throughout society, as oftentimes sustainable innovations face sociotechnical evolution [23]. 
Sociotechnical transitions involve a web of many interdependent actors, thereby favoring 
incremental innovations and discouraging radical innovations. Incremental innovations improve 
existing technologies, while radical innovations are discontinuous, potentially resulting in significant 
changes for the entire network [23]. 
 
Early adoption of sustainable innovations is particularly impacted by three attributes: instrumental, 
environmental, and symbolic [24]. The instrumental attribute refers to the perceived working 
impact of the sustainable innovation, the environmental attribute refers to the perceived 
ecological effect of the sustainable innovation, and the symbolic attribute refers to the perceived 
related character and societal prestige. These three attributes successfully predicted the adoption 
of current popular sustainable innovations which are publicly obvious like electric cars, as well as 
ones which are less noticeable, like renewable energy [24].  
 
The market has long been focused on short-term investments and gains. As a result, innovating 
for the long-term requires rethinking strategies [25] and expanding beyond existing institutional 
knowledge. Societal impact needs to be accounted for in the adoption and diffusion of sustainable 
innovations, as they often have a broader impact on society. Existing market forces may oppose 
sustainable innovations. Policies may not support the innovations. There may not be accreditation 
available for the new technology, or there may be subsidies in place for competing technologies 
that are not available for the innovations [5].  
 
Barriers to adopting sustainable innovations for agriculture in Europe were identified by Long et 
al., and summarized in Table 1. Although this study focused on agriculture, the barriers and the 
6 
 
details both follow for other sustainable innovations. Analogous barriers are identified in the text 
below to the diffusion of solar energy. Table 1 neatly summarizes findings explored in the text for 
the barriers to the diffusion of sustainable innovations. These broadly include economic, 
institutional/regulatory, behavioral/psychological, organizational, consumer/market, and social 
factors. 
Table 1: Barriers to the Diffusion of Sustainable Innovations [5] 
Barrier Detail Sources 
Economic 
High initial investments [27-36] 
Poor access to capital 
Hidden costs 
Competing financial priorities 
Long payback periods (ROI) 
Switching costs/existence of installed base 
High implementation costs (actual and perceived) 
Uncertain returns and results 
Temporal asymmetry between costs and benefits 
Over discounting the future 
Institutional/ 
Regulatory 
Low institutional support [25] [26] [27] 
[28] Use of overly scientific language (jargon) 
Practitioners’ knowledge gained from experience not 
considered R&D 
Lack of regulatory framework 
Prohibitively prescriptive standards 
Behavioral/  
Psychological 
Lack of management support/awareness [29] [30] [37-41] 
Conflict with traditional methods 
Overly complex technologies 
Results/effects of technology difficult to observe 
Practitioners’ beliefs and opinions 
Low trust of advisers or consultants/lack of acceptance 
Irrational behavior 
Negative presumed assumptions 
Organizational 
Lack required competencies/skills [25] [29] [31] 
[32] [27] [33] Poor readiness 
Poor information 
Inability to assess technologies 
Overly short-term/perverse rewards focus 
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Organizational inertia/habitual routines 
Consumers/  
Market 
Poor information [26] [29] [34] 
[27] [33] [35] Lack market attractiveness/do not align to preferences 
Uncertainty 
Consumers/farmers level of motivation 
Market uncertainty 
Social Social/peer pressures [25] 
 
Identified in Table 1 above, societal influences on the adoption of sustainable innovation can be 
significant. One human trait that negatively impacts the prioritization of sustainable innovations is 
the tendency of people to discount the future. In a study of the psychology and sociology of 
adoption of sustainable building practices [36], researchers found that individuals tended to view 
the future in a rosy as opposed to realistic light [37], which negatively impacted adoption rates. 
Individuals also stereotyped others who adopted sustainable building practices as part of liberal 
culture [38], which further impacted adoption rates [5]. 
 
Sustainable innovations diffuse more readily if they are in alignment with existing practices [45-
52]. Elements within a practice may be loosely or heavily dependent on one another. Loose 
linkages will result in little if any observable change, while tight linkages will generate disruption. 
For example, switching from incandescent to more efficient light emitting diode bulbs, there is 
little change in the light that is generated, aesthetics or ambience, and therefore linkages are 
loose. Loose linkages are more likely to be quickly adopted. For adoption of sustainable 
innovations where heavily dependent elements are at play, behavior modification is often slow, 
for example shorter showers for water conservation or laundering clothes at low temperatures. 
Tight linkages between elements where the sustainable innovation is attempting to gain hold 
result in slower adoption [20]. In the adoption of grid-tied solar energy, the linkage for individual 
consumers is loose. The individual notices no difference in the use or convenience of their 
electric systems, since they behave exactly as before. However, the linkage for electric utilities is 
tight and distributed generation creates disruption, resulting in slower adoption.  
 
Since in most situations where sustainable innovations are created, needs are already being met 
through existing products, the uptake of sustainable innovations requires transforming needs, as 
opposed to meeting them [20]. In the case of renewable energy, policy helps to instigate 
transformation by setting up protected spaces for niche technologies to thrive. Research 
conducted on strategic niche management and the uptake of PV in the UK found that protected 
places for sustainable technologies was necessary for the innovation to develop to the point of 
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being able to compete in the open market setting. The study found that these protected spaces 
are fashioned by society and notably, therefore disputed politically [39].  
 
The diffusion of distributed generation such as solar energy as a sustainable innovation in the 
energy sector faces its own unique set of barriers. Factors contributing to higher early adoption 
rates of solar energy at the individual level include greater awareness or knowledge, and a lack of 
sensitivity to cost. Other contributing factors to adoption include energy cost savings and word-of-
mouth [40]. While advantages relative to the incumbent technology, such as cost, are important 
factors in the adoption of photovoltaics, social and psychological factors including environmental 
awareness and prestige also significantly impact adoption [41].   
 
2.2 Innovating in a Monopoly Market  
In the interest of self-preservation, established companies have a vested interest in being 
innovative. Yet, strategic innovations typically result from new entrants as opposed to established 
companies [42]. Incumbents often do not innovate in the interest of preserving the status quo, 
due to existing structure or culture, and an unwillingness to abandon the profitable present for an 
uncertain future [42]. In his study of disruptive innovations, Christensen believes that established 
companies could also fail because they follow their own value network, stay too close and listen 
exclusively to the main stream customers, ignoring new entrants which eventually disrupt the 
established companies [6]. 
 
2.2.1 Innovation in monopoly markets 
In 1943, Joseph Schumpeter argued that monopolies are uniquely able to accelerate innovation 
by virtue of their available resources to fund research and development [43]. Adolf and Gardiner 
on the other hand, argued in 1932 that monopolies are less likely to innovate due to structural 
rigidity [44]. Later on, identifying competition as the primary impelling cause behind innovation, 
Arrow maintained that monopolies are less likely to innovate due to the lack of competition in a 
monopoly market [45]. A diverse set of studies since has sought to determine how competition 
impacts innovation, with nuanced results. Examining innovation from the perspective of research 
and development (R&D) spending, Loury determines that “perfect” competition decreases R&D 
spending on an individual basis, but still results in a higher likelihood that society will have a 
reduced wait time for innovation to occur. He determines the ideal amount of competition lies 
directly in between Adam Smith’s pure competition where monopolies are limited and R&D 
performance is the highest, and Schumpeter’s momentary monopolies as part of a natural 
evolution that eventually get eroded as competition, replication, and innovation arise [46]. Cohen 
and Levin found that research over time had broadened from a focus on size and market 
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concentration to other determinants of innovation. They further showed that patent data is not 
necessarily indicative of innovation, as patent protection varies wildly between different industries 
[47]. Gilbert determined that monopolies do not promote innovation, yet also found that 
competition does not necessarily promote innovation either. His research found weak links 
between, and no optimal level of competition and R&D [48]. A recent study of U.S. patent data 
combined with companies’ productivity, however, demonstrated a clear positive relationship 
between competition and innovation [49]. 
 
Under the condition of intense competition, there are greater incentives for both product and 
process innovations. Incentives to innovate in process for protected monopolies directly correlate 
to the profits a firm can protect or earn by innovating. If a new product renders the existing 
product obsolete, the incentive to innovate would be high in a competitive marketplace. If the new 
product does not render the existing product obsolete (non-drastic innovation), the incentive to 
innovate would be less [48].  
 
For monopolies, there is a clearer incentive to engage in process innovations, as these could 
result in a healthier bottom line by improving efficiency. However, an innovative product would 
compete with an existing offering. Revenue generated by a new product would result in a loss 
from the old technology, thus de-incentivizing innovation through the loss of extant profits, coined 
the “replacement effect” [50]. The monopoly continues to enjoy profits regardless of whether or 
not it innovates [51] and this appears especially true for a regulated rate-of-return monopoly. 
Rate-of-return monopolies have even less reason to innovate as they have guaranteed 
customers and further guaranteed set profit. However, a monopoly could potentially benefit more 
from a new product by differentiating offerings with customers, compared to a competitor with 
only the new product to offer customers [52]. A clear example of this is a competitor who is 
offering a new product in the distributed generation (DG) market, IPPs. Partial deregulation 
facilitated the ability of IPPs in some instances to sell renewably-sourced and/or lower-cost power 
directly to consumers. Any consumers participating in this scheme will still rely on backup power 
through the monopoly utility. Since the competitor in this case only has the new product, DG 
power, to offer, the monopoly could potentially benefit more by offering customers the whole 
package, including DG. Yet it is unclear what the payback would have to be in order for 
monopolies to risk offering a new product as compared to maintaining the status quo. 
 
Segments of the private sector are poised to adopt innovations quickly and respond better to 
market changes. The incentive for a monopoly to innovate depends upon the difference in benefit 
with and without the innovation. If the benefit is high, there may be incentive to innovate. If the 
benefit is unclear or low, then the costs of innovation and the failure rates of innovation may 
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outweigh any incentive to innovate. Innovation is risky [53] and determining potential benefits of 
an innovation in advance can be challenging at best. Risk assessments, including benefit to 
customers, required resource allocation, market timing and other variables, attempt to predict 
those benefits compared to innovation costs [54]. Part of the risk assessment is understanding 
innovation successes to begin with, which by one measure is the number of marketplace failures, 
accounting for close to 90% of ideas [55]. Failure is as inevitable as innovation. Most new 
ventures fail, the majority of products don’t succeed, and most startups also fail [56].  
 
Other determinants to innovation are organizational in nature. Corporate culture is key – 
successful innovators develop a culture that encourages experimentation and discontent with the 
status quo. This sort of innovative mind-set is often challenging for incumbents to generate and 
indeed may be in conflict with a general attitude of satisfaction with the status quo [42].  
 
IOUs are organized as rate-of-return regulated monopolies in many countries including the U.S.. 
By being granted a specific customer base they are required to serve, they are also guaranteed a 
reasonable rate of return in exchange. In his study of the utility industry, Mark Frank found that 
the principal weakness of rate-of-return monopolies was the negative impact this organizational 
structure had on technological innovation [57]. Another study found incremental innovation at 
work in monopolistic utility structures, with accompanying incremental change. This study found 
that when the utility market was deregulated, increased competition broke down barriers to 
radical innovation for the incumbents [58].  
 
The movement towards deregulation in the electric sector around the world in recent decades 
opened up opportunities to examine the impacts of increased competition in the marketplace on 
innovations. The electric utility industry is unique in that much of the R&D in the regulated rate-of-
return monopolistic marketplace has been focused on activities which are in the public’s interest 
but do not advance the long-term financial benefit of the company, such as energy efficiency 
initiatives. Wang and Mogi studied the impact of deregulation on the Japanese electric sector, 
which is in alignment with similar efforts elsewhere in the world, that took place in year 2017 [58].  
 
Wang and Mogi found that the effects of deregulation and competition in the Japanese electric 
utility market resulted in reduced R&D expenditures, but increased patent activities, which could 
be an indicator of the company’s innovation capability. However, with a deregulated marketplace, 
unprotected intellectual property that was not beneficial under the regulated marketplace may 
become more valuable for new competition, thus incentivizing patent activity but not necessarily 
indicating innovation. Further, short-term gains in R&D efficiency accompanied by a reduction in 
R&D expenditures may eventually result in long-term negative impacts on innovation, an idea that 
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has been shown to be the case in both the US by Sanyal and Cohen [59], and the UK by Jamasb 
and Pollitt [60].As a conclusion, Wang and Mogi stated that: 
“Innovation in the electricity industry exhibits strong path dependence. Therefore, at 
incumbent utilities, we find incremental innovation, which builds high barriers for radical 
change” [58]. 
 
Deregulation prompted innovation in the EU electric utility market according to Markard and 
Truffer [61], and similarly occurred in the liberalization of the Japanese market. R&D expenditures 
were maintained in areas that had the potential to cut costs and therefore increase profits, but not 
in efforts beneficial to the public at-large that would reduce utility revenue, such as renewable 
energy or energy efficiency [58]. Utility generation mix also has an impact on R&D expenditures, 
with utilities sourcing their power in part from nuclear demonstrating higher R&D expenditures 
[59] [76-78]. This effect was particularly notable in the Japanese market following the Fukushima 
nuclear meltdown. 
 
As it may be difficult or impossible for new entrants to enter a market dominated by monopolies,  
pathways exist for innovations to happen in a market dominated by monopolies by effectively 
utilizing the platforms and/or distribution channels created by the monopolies. Using the platform 
strategy, monopolies can drive innovations without taking risks themselves. Companies that have 
successfully created platforms won out over those that tried to internally manage innovation. The 
Blackberry and iPhone had similar features, but the Apple app store platform provided added 
value to the iPhone where developers could feature their innovations. The app store provides a 
platform for all the app developers to develop and distribute their programs (apps) through its 
distribution channel, ultimately contributing to the success of Apple. Another example is the 
Amazon monopoly that provides a distribution channel for small businesses to sell on its platform 
[62]. 
 
A modular design is one which incorporates multiple components or processes which are 
produced by different companies or departments. Innovating through the use of modular designs 
can facilitate rapid advancement. A monopoly can innovate by encouraging and incentivizing 
innovation in complementary, discrete modules, minimizing any negative impact, and ensuring 
continued integrity of the whole product or process. An example of modular design is software 
development that is divided into segments, with distinct actors working on independent segments. 
A specific example is the Linux operating system, with modules which continue to be developed 
open source by individuals [63]. 
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Policy makers can also help advance societal priorities by providing protective spaces, or niches, 
for bolstering niche markets which are determined to be in the best interest of society. Protective 
spaces can serve to shield, nurture, and empower a new technology that would not thrive on its 
own. These protective spaces have boosted installed distributed generation in the electricity 
generation mix [39].  
 
2.3 Summary 
The diffusion of sustainable innovations and the speed of that diffusion are affected by a diverse 
set of factors, including economic, regulatory, psychological, organizational, and social. The 
adoption of sustainable innovations in the monopoly situation is of particular interest, as it 
correlates to the adoption of renewable distributed generation in the monopolistic electric utility 
market. Monopolies’ incentive to innovate is directly correlated to the potential impact on their 
bottom line, whether the innovation be product or process. If a negative impact on their revenue 
stream is anticipated, the motivation to innovate will likely be externally driven by competition or 
regulation.  
 
Diffusion of innovation in the electric utility market, which has historically been served by 
protected monopolies due to the societal benefits associated with stable electric supply, is 
changing as markets become deregulated. Studies indicate a short-term increase in R&D 
efficiency related to deregulation shown by a reduction in expenditures accompanied by 
increased patent activity, as competitors enter the marketplace. Innovators have the opportunity 
to enter the market via platform strategy, distribution channels, modularity and niche market 
creation.  
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3.0 Research Questions and Method 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
The successful and rapid adoption of sustainable innovations is critical in order to mitigate climate 
change. The most significant source of global greenhouse gas emissions is the production of 
electricity from fossil fuels [2]. Electricity production in the U.S. made up 35% of total CO2 
emissions in 2016, with 98% of total emissions derived from coal (68%) and natural gas (30%) [3]. 
Seventy-three percent of electric meters in the U.S. are owned and operated by IOUs, which were 
granted a monopoly in return for least-cost, reliable and stable electric supply [8]. IOUs therefore 
present a significant opportunity for facilitating the rapid adoption of distributed generation. There 
must be economic, regulatory, psychological, organizational, and social incentives to overcome 
barriers and turn them into opportunities in order for sustainable innovations to be adopted.  
 
Electric utilities guaranteed a rate of return by regulators would theoretically not experience any 
impact on their bottom line whether they innovate or not. As Wang and Mogi showed in their 
study of Japanese electric market deregulation, there was no incentive for utilities to innovate in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy as the adoption of these would reduce profits [58]. Due 
to structural rigidity, monopolies do not innovate, especially when there is no competition [58-59]. 
 
An innovative product that competes with an existing offering could result in financial loss from 
the old technology, de-incentivizing innovation through the loss of extant profits, coined the 
“replacement effect” [50]. The monopoly continues to enjoy profits regardless of whether or not it 
innovates [51]. 
 
If the benefit for an innovation is high, there may be incentive for the monopoly to innovate. Yet if 
the benefit is unclear or low, then the costs of innovation and the failure rates of innovation may 
outweigh any incentive to innovate. Since innovation is risky, [53] and failure is an intrinsic part of 
innovation [56], natural rate-of-return monopolies without any competition do not exhibit an 
incentive to adopt sustainable innovations which could reduce their profits, opposite to 
Schumpeter’s theory that monopolies are effective innovators.  
 
From the perspective of the natural monopoly, three of five reasons from LaMorte’s innovation 
diffusion factors are invalidated. A sustainable innovation may not offer the monopoly utility 
comparative advantages over the existing product. For the monopoly a sustainable innovation 
may not be compatible with existing cultural norms, and for the monopoly utility the new product 
does not have comparative benefits. However, cultural norms within the natural monopoly may 
differ from those of society, or a segment of customers. A sustainable innovation may offer 
consumers and society-at-large advantages over the existing product, for example less pollution. 
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Consumers may recognize other benefit to sustainable innovations that are not applicable within 
the monopoly. Companies are driven to change through consumer demand, yet with captive 
customers, monopolies have less incentive to appeal to consumer demand. As with other 
innovations, factors preventing them from adopting sustainable innovations include uncertainty 
and risk, and pressure from stakeholders [5].  
 
“All evidence suggests that most strategic innovations come from outsiders, rarely from 
established players” [42]. 
  
The first research question to investigate is: 
1. Can natural monopolies be  effective in promoting sustainable innovations? 
 
If natural monopolies are not effective at promoting sustainable innovations, how can sustainable 
innovations be promoted in this market?  
 
Since needs are already being met through existing products, diffusion of sustainable innovations 
requires transforming needs, as opposed to meeting them [20]. One way in which policy helps to 
instigate transformation by setting up protected spaces for niche technologies to thrive [39]. For 
renewable energy, these protected spaces frequently take the form of economic incentives or 
subsidies via feed-in-tariffs, rebates, and so on. Policy also sets up regulatory framework for 
allowing grid integration, component testing and accreditation. Innovations generating disruptions 
in monopolies are frequently caused by regulation, often leading to partial disruption and not a 
replacement of all technological competencies.  
 
Distributed generation (DG) is not currently a replacement of all technological competencies held 
by electric utilities, which include generation, transmission and distribution. DG competes with the 
generation aspect, leading to partial disruption, but does not make the other generators obsolete 
since it is not dispatchable. Nor does DG currently render transmission and distribution obsolete. 
With coming advancements in energy storage, however, DG will become dispatchable and has 
the potential to compete with both generation and with distribution, potentially allowing customers 
to abandon the grid. If electric utility managers begin acting on the real risk that customers will 
defect as energy storage technologies continue to advance, they may get motivated to change.  
 
An analogous transition in a monopoly satisfied with the status quo occurred to AT&T in the 20th 
century. Early on, the company grew as the U.S. government argued that all citizens should have 
phone service for national security reasons, and in 1918 began to regulate rates and competition. 
AT&T became a monopoly serving a significant swath of the market, and was considered by 
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many throughout much of the 20th century to be a natural monopoly. AT&T was forced to change 
by several judicial decisions in the 1950s, 60s, and 80s that opened up the market, including an 
anti-trust ruling in 1982 that split the company [64]. 
  
Prior to the decision, not only did one have to purchase phone service through them, AT&T also 
required monthly rental of AT&T brand telephones in order to utilize their grid. After deregulation, 
the industry was forced to open up to allow other manufacturers of phones on their network. 
Following the decision, as opposed to renting phones for a monthly fee, consumers were now 
able to purchase their own phones and use them on the AT&T network, resulting in a major loss 
of revenue for AT&T, and eventually the closure of its phone manufacturing plants that were 
producing undesirable outdated designs [64]. Disruptive competition in phone service would not 
have occurred without the interference of policy.  
 
AT&T continues to respond to changes hitting the telecommunications industry, as fewer 
consumers, only one in four, maintain landlines. Indeed, AT&T plans to dismantle all of its 
landlines by 2020 but this transition will depend upon policy since service providers are not 
allowed to discontinue service if a customer still wants the service. The most heavily impacted 
customers are those in poverty who can’t afford wireless service, and those in rural areas who do 
not have viable alternatives. Similar to electric utilities, “landline phone companies have 
regulatory obligations in most states to supply lines at a reasonable cost to anyone who wants 
one. They also need federal approval to end service” [65]. A rapidly dwindling landline customer 
base spurred AT&T to advance legislation in 21 states over the past year, seeking needed 
regulatory permission to stop providing landline phone service. Designated as the “carrier of last 
resort by the FCC in 21 states” [66], the company is therefore obligated to continue providing 
service to all customers who request it, and at the lowest possible cost. Twenty states approved 
of the request by AT&T to stop providing landline service, with critics decrying the effort, 
advocating for those who continue to rely on landline service for communication and expressing 
concern than service that remains will be less reliable and more expensive.  
 
“The push from the telecom industry is forcing policymakers to re-examine what has long 
been a basic guarantee of government – that every American home should have access 
to a phone, along with other utilities such as water or electricity” [67]. 
 
The second research question therefore is: 
2. For sustainable innovations that are potentially disruptive to diffuse in a natural 
monopoly market, does regulation play a critical role, as opposed to market forces?  
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As shown in the AT&T example, monopolies will be forced to change when regulations shift in the 
way to promote or favor the innovation that disrupts the monopoly company. Therefore, the next 
research question is: how can a monopoly company quickly adapt when such change happens, 
or how can a monopoly company proactively change before it is forced to do so?  
 
Many incumbent firms have failed to react appropriately in the face of innovation. Christensen 
discusses the following reasons: companies follow their own value network that values only the 
mainstream market, companies fail to anticipate new technological innovations, and companies 
ignore new entrants [6]. However, in the regulated monopoly situation, the monopoly will still be 
the one most likely to win provided they conform their business with existing competence. There 
are various methods monopolies can deploy in order to drive innovations without taking risks 
themselves, for example the platform strategy which makes use of existing competencies, which 
in the case of electric utilities includes the transmission and distribution grid, and interfacing with 
customers [62]. 
 
Understanding a firm’s core strengths is of critical importance when facing a disruption. While 
distributed generation adds electrons to the grid, it does not take the place of many existing core 
competencies in electric service delivery. As utilities move into the future electricity markets, it will 
be important to determine which core competencies will need to be sustained, and which should 
be overhauled or eliminated.  
 
An example of the role of understanding and exploiting core competencies occurred during the 
disruption from analog to digital photography. Fujifilm and Kodak critically differed in how they 
viewed their respective core competences. Whereas Kodak identified brand and marketing as 
their core competence, Fujifilm regarded engineering skills and quality control as their core 
competences. These very different identities led to divergent strategies in dealing with the 
disruption they faced. Fujifilm successfully embraced the new digital technology, thriving through 
the disruption, while Kodak continued to try and hold onto their existing identification with analog. 
The two firms departed from similar revenue levels, employees and market share in 2001 to 
Fujifilm reaching 13 times the revenue of Kodak 15 years later as Fujifilm embraced the digital 
revolution. In 2016, Kodak employed 6,100 people to Fujifilm’s 78,150, with $1.5b compared to 
$20.8b of revenue respectively [11]. Based on the case study of Fujifilm and Kodak during their 
transition during the digital disruption, this same study by Ho and Chen suggests that companies 
that are able to transform the organization to adapt to new business conditions created by the 
disruptive innovation while maintaining organizational continuity have a better chance to survive 
and thrive during and after the disruption of innovations [12]. 
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An example of not adapting and conforming to evolving consumer expectations, and failing to 
continue to innovate, is the aforementioned AT&T phone manufacturing that relied on exclusivity 
of the marketplace, rather than innovation. As soon as competitors were allowed access to the 
market, AT&T completely lost its market share and had to close telephone manufacturing plants. 
By the time they considered reacting, it was too late [64]. 
 
“Long-term market leaders focus intently on future emerging mass markets. They 
innovate relentlessly to cater to that emerging market (e.g., Procter & Gamble) and are 
paranoid about competitors getting there first (e.g., Intel, Microsoft). Most importantly, 
they are willing to cannibalize their current assets to realize that future potential (e.g., 
Gillette in the wet shaving market or Procter & Gamble in detergents). In contrast, 
dominant incumbents that succumb to technological change are content with past 
successes, are disdainful of new entrants, focus on current products or current 
customers, and are highly unwilling to cannibalize current assets and products to build 
future markets (e.g., Xerox in the 1970s and 1980s)” [68]. 
 
The third research question therefore is: 
3. Is a monopoly incumbent firm that is able to adapt and conform its business to 
strategically and actively incorporate a sustainable innovation into its existing 
competence less likely to be disrupted by such innovation? 
 
As history sees many examples of companies that failed to incorporate innovations which later 
disrupted the business, one important question to ask next is: What enables a monopoly 
incumbent firm to actively change to incorporate the sustainable innovation? 
 
In order to establish success, it is critical to determine how leaders of incumbent firms deal with 
change. What is their internal organizational culture, and do they ceaselessly innovate [68]? In 
order to be successful at deploying sustainable innovations, a company must be unique in many 
aspects, including culture, leadership, business practice, partnerships, and client emphasis [21]. 
Culture cultivated within a company allows it to adapt to a changing world, reward and motivate 
employees, promote diversity, and create new opportunities in future markets, among other 
aspects. Effective leadership through the market transition is critical to a firm’s success [69].  
 
Deregulation of the electric grid facilitates the use of the grid platform for wheeling solar electricity 
by IPPs. Increased social support for and understanding of solar energy also improves the 
diffusion of this innovation. Sustainable innovations that require broader cultural change take 
much longer to diffuse or may not achieve diffusion [20]. If the product being delivered serves the 
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same function as the incumbent product, for example, electricity, and the innovation is effectively 
invisible to society, it requires no cultural change. The cultural change that is required for such 
sustainable innovations is within the monopoly incumbent. The primary barrier identified for the 
adoption of sustainable innovations inside a company is that it would require a change in the 
corporate mindset [22].  
 
One of the challenges for monopolies is in adopting new strategies for conducting business [70]. 
Not only are incumbents faced with the challenge of learning from innovations in the deregulated 
marketplace, they must also unlearn strategies which relied on the former dominant paradigm 
[88-90]. This type of transition requires leadership able to guide an organization through this 
rebirth [69].  
 
Yet a leader with a vision alone is not enough. The effective leader needs to sell their vision to 
staff as well as the Board, which is especially true in the U.S., with the existing financial system’s 
focus on short-term gains. In the case of Kodak, shareholder pressure for short-term gains 
combined with high executive compensation contributed to the inability to diversify and 
subsequent lack of development in the digital market, when ironically Kodak actually invented the 
first digital camera. Fujifilm on the other hand, profited from the long-term culture within the 
company itself as well as the culture of Japanese society, which facilitated the successful pursuit 
of the leader’s vision for the future of the company outside of short-term interests [11]. 
  
At AT&T in the mid-1900s, the company built commitment and motivation in its employees, 
rewarding them with guaranteed employment for life. The obedience and conformity AT&T 
required in return squashed creativity, change and diversity. Until 1973, when AT&T settled a 
massive affirmative action settlement, zero women had been recruited into the company’s 
management training program, and few people of color. Personality tests were required for 
executive men, demonstrating psychological suitability, in order to advance. AT&T was 
predictable, regimented, and took too long to deliver new technologies to market. They did not 
have an environment that encouraged innovation, and were completely stunned by the disruption 
of the 1982 antitrust decision resulting in a breakup, pressed forward by competing marketplace 
advances and public impatience with the lethargy at AT&T [71]. 
 
“The big challenge for established companies is organizational: they need to develop the 
culture, mind-set, and underlying environment to continually question current success 
while promoting continual experimentation” [42]. 
 
The fourth research question therefore is: 
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4. Does the right environment/culture enable the strategic change needed for a monopoly 
incumbent firm to adopt sustainable innovations that are potentially disruptive? 
 
Besides the right environment and culture needed for a monopoly incumbent firm to enable the 
strategic change, recognizing the need to change is also critical.   
 
Established companies fail when they ignore new entrants, and when they stay too close to 
existing customers [6]. The market size for an innovation initially is often small, so a firm has an 
opportunity to quickly recognize and respond to any core sales reductions. Understanding 
existing competences, recognizing whether they can or should be sustained and having the 
courage to act on it, all while exploiting opportunities to diversify will help a firm respond to 
innovation. Fujifilm correctly anticipated the digital disruption and proactively exploited new 
business opportunities, while Kodak sat on its heels, waiting for analog to return [11].  
 
Sustainable innovations will be adopted at a greater rate with loose linkage between elements 
[20]. From the customer perspective, there is a loose linkage between elements when 
considering adding a renewable energy system because it does not impact electricity availability 
or lifestyle. The linkage is tight, however, from the perspective of the utility, as the uptake of 
renewable energy disrupts the existing practice of electricity generation and distribution as a 
whole. Monopolies are more likely to adopt incremental innovations [58]. It follows that diffusion of 
renewable energy at the utility will be lethargic. 
 
As established earlier, in order for an innovation to be adopted, it must have observable benefits 
over the incumbent product [19]. A natural monopoly may struggle to derive any potential benefits 
arising from a product perceived to be competitive. Outside of direct revenue impacts, the utility 
has an opportunity to exploit benefits of adopting renewable energy, which could include 
enhanced reputation and brand value as demonstrated by Keeble et al [21]. 
 
Marketing value of adopting sustainable innovations is exploited by firms in the open market. The 
adoption of sustainable innovations serve to enhance reputation and brand value [21]. Indeed, 
corporations from Budweiser to Macy’s are advertising their use of renewable energy to power 
their operations, recognizing consumer demand for increased corporate responsibility in the face 
of climate change and other challenges. According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, 
U.S. corporations are installing solar energy at their facilities all over the United States, with 
Target at the top of the list with the most solar energy installed in 2017, Walmart at second place, 
and others in the “Top 10 Corporate solar users” list including Costco, IKEA, Amazon, and Apple 
[72].  
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Long Island Power Authority is a State of New York publicly-owned transmission and distribution 
utility. Stemming from the poor response after Hurricane Sandy, LIPA underwent a 
transformation. One of LIPA’s first goals was to understand what their customer’s needs were. 
Through surveys, they found that their customers valued reliable electric service above all else. In 
response, LIPA has been investing in grid reliability measures such as storm preparedness and 
grid reliability [73]. In terms of renewables, LIPA presents their commitment to deployment as 
being driven by compliance with the State of New York’s Clean Energy Standard, enabling 
customers with choices, and reducing peak energy use [73]. 
  
The Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) is embracing the use of solar energy by incorporating it 
into its strategy to deliver reliable electricity to its customer base, as this base grows. In small 
towns where population growth is predictably driving an increase in electricity consumption, but 
where the distribution grid was not built to support it, LIPA is paying developers to install 
distributed generation systems. LIPA estimates that constructing additional power generation 
capacity locally, right where it is consumed, will save the company more than $80 million dollars 
in grid expansion [74]. 
 
“It’s actually cost-effective to add renewables.” LIPA VP of Environmental Affairs, Michael 
Deering 
 
The fifth research question therefore is: 
5. Is a monopoly incumbent able to recognize and pursue new market opportunities 
arising out of a sustainable innovation instead of viewing it as disruptive more likely to 
contribute to the successful diffusion of such innovation? 
 
3.2 Research Method 
This thesis intends to examine the role of rate-of-return regulated electric utility monopolies in the 
adoption of renewable energy innovations, and posits five research questions related above. 
Analysis based on literature and available data has been performed and the research questions 
were developed from the literature and tested using a case study to contextually relate concepts. 
Data was gathered from a variety of secondary sources including industry publications, reports, 
government publications, and peer-reviewed academic studies. Industry sources included Solar 
Energy Industries Association website and the associated publications, Fortune Magazine, Power 
Magazine, and the GreenTech Media website and its publications. Reports included the Arthur D. 
Little Innovation High Ground Report. Government sources included the U.S. Department of 
Energy, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
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and the Vermont Public Utilities Commission. Sources for academic studies included eight from 
Energy Policy, five from the Journal of Cleaner Production, two from the Journal of Organizational 
Change Management, two from Organization and Environment, two from Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, and one from Energy Policy. 
 
To answer the research questions, the US utility industry is targeted in the case study. One case 
study was selected in this nascent industry as an example of success, so it is not necessarily 
representative for industries in other locales or in other situations. Distributed generation (DG) is 
a sustainable innovation transforming the electricity system. Solar photovoltaics (PV) in particular 
has the potential to create long-term impacts due to its flexible scalability compared to other DG 
including solar thermal, wind or hydropower. While it remains a site-specific resource as are the 
other DG technologies, PV is widely deployable (38.6% of our total annual generation needs can 
be met through rooftop solar [75]), and the same essential components are used in both utility-
scale and residential applications so PV installations can succeed at many scales and in many 
locales. Associated supply and demand cost reductions also contribute to this scalable 
deployment by means of utilizing the same essential components. Oftentimes the most cost 
effective DG to deploy is PV. 
 
3.2.1 Background – The electricity industry in the United States 
In the beginning of the 20th century, states started regulating the nascent electricity industry 
through the establishment of Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs). Companies were provided 
exclusive rights to operate within a given territory in exchange for being regulated [76]. 
Customers who lived in a given utility service territory had no agency in choosing which utility to 
purchase power from, but PUCs regulated these electric monopolies by determining the profit 
level for the companies, and also the price that the captive customers would have to pay for their 
services. This system worked well until prices started rising due to the energy crisis and 
increasing environmental regulations in the 1970s [76].  
 
In response, Congress passed the National Energy Act in 1978, significantly consisting of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). PURPA facilitated the partial deregulation of the 
wholesale electric market by requiring utilities to interconnect with nonutility facilities that were 
registered with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and generating power [76]. 
PURPA is often the mechanism by which renewable energy is added to the grid by IPPs [77]. 
 
Additional regulations impact the diffusion of renewables in the local grids. At the State level, net 
metering rules incentivize or discourage renewable energy deployment in the United States. The 
State can require or encourage generating utilities to incorporate a certain percentage of 
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renewables into their grid, sometimes even specifying the portion of solar and wind required 
within a certain timeframe through their renewable portfolio standards (RPS). The adoption of 
State-level RPS swept many states throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. These standards are 
often voluntary, and aim to variously reduce dependence on fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions, 
and increase renewable energy deployments oftentimes by specifying a percentage of electricity 
generation which must come from renewables within a given timeframe [78]. Ownership issues 
can also be specified in law, for example third-party ownership, leasing agreements, conversion 
of farmland, and so on [79]. 
 
Electric utilities in the U.S. are often distinguished by whether they are generation and 
transmission (G&T), and/or distribution. Many utilities own the means of generation as well as 
service end-consumers with both transmission and distribution. The majority of utilities are 
municipal utilities (62%), yet they serve only 10% of the population. The remaining utilities are 
publicly owned or cooperatively owned. Most small utilities are distribution utilities, with many 
owning small peaking plants used only when requested by the independent system operator 
(ISO) or regional transmission organization (RTO). Like other monopolies, electric utilities control 
the distribution channel and the platform [8]. 
 
About one-third of electric utilities in the United States, less than 1,000 utilities, actually produce 
power, while the remaining two-thirds simply resell and distribute that power [81]. Owning the 
means of generation and distribution means that utilities play a major role in the adoption and 
integration of renewable energy into the electricity distribution system. Figure 3 below shows the 
breakdown of utility organizational structure versus percent of population served. As evidenced 
by Figure 2, IOUs are the dominant design of electric utilities in the U.S. since they serve 73% of 
the public [8]. Other electric utilities are organized as cooperatives, municipally owned, and 
publicly owned. Since IOUs control the majority of electricity supply in the United States and as a 
result often face different regulations than non-IOUs [8], they are in a unique position to control 
the speed at which distributed generation diffuses, and thus the primary focus of this research is 
on IOUs. A natural monopoly creates high barriers to entry that limit or prevent competition. Very 
high infrastructure costs related to the investment in power plants and transmission and 
distribution lines make electric utilities natural monopolies. [80] 
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3.2.2 Background – Growth of Solar Energy in the United States 
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the vast majority of electricity generation in the United States 
remains fossil-fuel and nuclear-based [82] [8]. Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown of renewables 
on the grid, with the majority comprised of hydropower and wind [82]. Since deregulation of the 
electricity wholesale markets occurred in the late 1970s, innovating IPPs have been making use 
of the grid platform and entering the formerly monopoly-dominated wholesale electricity market. 
Growth in IPPs started in the 1980s and was initially driven by traditional fossil fuel energy 
sources. As the price of wind and solar dramatically decreased, some IPPs expanded by 
investing in utility-scale renewable power plants, and wheeling renewable power over the existing 
grid platform, attracted by relatively low operations and maintenance costs, as well as zero 
ongoing fuel supply costs. Currently 40% of the U.S. electricity generation market is held by IPPs 
[9]. IPPs have provided 80% of the total investment made in installing renewable power plants 
[83]. 
0.32% 0.64%
15.52%
19.30%
31.15% 33.07%
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
2017 U.S. Electricity Generation by Source
Other gases Petroleum Renewables Nuclear Coal Natural Gas
Investor-
Owned 
Utilities, 73%
Municipal 
Utilities, 10%
Rural Electric 
Cooperative 
Utilities, 13% Federal and 
Publicly-Owned 
Utilities, 4%
% OF POPULATION
SERVED
Figure 2: Utility Structure vs. Percent of Population Served [8] 
Figure 3: Natural Gas, Coal, and Nuclear comprise 84% of total U.S. electricity generation 
[101] 
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Figure 4:  Hydropower and wind comprise the greatest proportion of renewables on 
the U.S. electricity grid [101] 
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Despite barriers to the diffusion of renewables into the existing electric grid, its overall 
incorporation increased by 7.82% between 2001 and 2017 accounting for a total increase of 958.5 
thousand MWh per day, as demonstrated by Figures 5 and 6. Over the last 17 years, the 
proportion of renewables on the U.S. electric grid has doubled, and solar energy has significantly 
increased. Hydropower and wind dwarf solar energy in the renewables category. Solar energy 
comprises a very small proportion of the total renewable portion of grid generation. Conventional 
hydropower (41.86%) and wind (37.73%) comprise the vast majority of renewable electricity 
generation, making up 79.59% of total renewable generation in 2017 [82]. By 2020, solar energy 
is projected to only make up 3% of the grid’s capacity [84]. Between 2012 and 2017, solar power 
expanded rapidly to make up 7.5% of total renewable generation in 2017 [82].  
Figure 5: U.S. Renewables and Natural Gas proportion of electricity generation 
increasing [8] 
Figure 6: Change by TMWh per day in electricity generation by source 2001-2017 
[101] 
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Natural gas increased in the electricity generation mix by 15.95%, accounting for a total increase 
of 1,970 thousand MWh per day. During the same time period, electricity power generation itself 
increased by 1,024.3 thousand MWh per day. So, the increase of renewable integration into the 
grid did not even accommodate the total increase in electricity generation driven by increased 
consumption [82]. The increase in natural gas electricity generation over the past 17 years 
essentially matched the reduction in coal generation, while renewable electricity generation 
added to the grid almost matched the total increase in electricity consumption nationwide.  
 
As shown in Figure 7 below, increases in renewable electricity generation have primarily come 
from solar and wind [82]. 
 
Figure 7: Within renewables, solar and wind account for most of the overall increase [101] 
Whether it is a G&T electric utility, and/or a distribution utility, one way in which utilities 
incorporate renewables is through distributed generation on their grid. End-users install 
renewable energy systems on their properties, and power their operations when the system is 
generating energy, put energy back onto the grid, or both at various times. Installations, 
depending on size, are sometimes incentivized by the utility in order to meet policy goals. Utilities 
also sometimes invest in their own renewable energy generating assets, wind farms or solar 
farms [8]. When utilities purchase power from the wholesale market, they may be purchasing 
renewable energy since it is often the cheapest electricity [85]. Since there are fuel input and 
shut-down costs associated with fossil fuel power plants but not with renewables, they are often 
cheapest and will bid into the grid at any price [85]. 
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Solar energy follows the S-curve (magnitude of product’s performance improvement differs as 
technologies mature), and incumbents’ response to substitution (old technology continued to be 
improved after new technology introduced, incumbent firms emphasize new technology 
shortcomings). In order to continue to thrive in the face of the change occurring in their industry, 
incumbent electric utilities must consider how best to react and take an active role in identifying 
technological competencies to thrive in the future. With this issue being nascent, there are not a 
lot of existing examples to follow, or longitudinal studies that help determine which course of 
action is the best to pursue in order to achieve the goals of stable electric service, offered at the 
lowest possible cost, while protecting the environment.  
 
Factors affecting the diffusion of solar energy are very similar to those impacting the diffusion of 
other sustainable innovations. Those categories are reflected in Section 2.1, Table 1, and include 
economic, institutional/regulatory, behavioral/psychological, organizational, and 
consumers/market. For example, policy can facilitate or prevent the incorporation of distributed 
generation into the electricity generation mix through common mechanisms like net metering. 
Depending on the structure of net metering policy, it can either improve the financial payback and 
incentivize investment by compensating generators at the retail rate, or disincentivize investment 
by compensating generators at the wholesale rate. Support from society can increase adoption 
and thereby drive down cost, and more research and development can overcome technical issues 
such as the lack of 24/7 availability. According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
generating 80% of our nation’s power supply from renewable energy by 2050 is technically 
feasible. In order to facilitate that shift, however, “both technological and institutional” innovation 
will be required, with both policy and social changes accompanying technological advancements 
[86]. Innovations are often slowly adopted over time, and this is no different for changes in 
electricity generation. However, the causes for relatively slow adoption of RE are particularly 
important to recognize when confronted with the rapid pace of climate change. Understanding and 
identifying specific barriers associated with the adoption of RE, and specifically solar energy, into 
the U.S. electric grid, will facilitate the design of appropriate solutions for overcoming these 
barriers [5].  
 
3.2.3 Research Method –the selection of case 
Evaluation of the research questions presented earlier in section 3 is conducted by a case study 
of an IOU that is a leader in innovation. Incumbent utilities throughout the United States have 
been slowly moving to adopt solar energy on their grids as demonstrated by the low percentage 
of penetration nationwide, but one IOU in particular stands out in striving to change along with the 
marketplace, Green Mountain Power (GMP) in Vermont. The generation mix of solar energy on 
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the GMP grid is 30 times the national average [87] [82]. GMP is innovating, and provides energy 
to customers that is greater than 60% renewable, with a mix of wind, solar, and hydro both self-
generated and purchased from other sources. GMP is further promoting customer-sited 
distributed generation, including solar with energy storage [88]. Their unique ability to change 
along with the market provides one interesting demonstration of a monopoly successfully 
incorporating sustainable innovations. Understanding how GMP has accomplished this is 
important to informing replication elsewhere. 
 
GMP is both a monopoly utility and an innovator. In order to find information on this company, 
which does not have a long history of incorporating renewable energy onto their grid, research 
was acquired in a variety of ways. Research media about the company included popular media 
articles, documents submitted to governmental regulatory bodies, and websites. Research media 
regarding electricity generation included data collected and generated by governmental entities. 
Scholarly articles on innovation adoption for monopolies as well as sustainable innovation 
adoption were studied. Data found showed detailed information regarding impacts of diffusion in 
the State of Vermont as well as the level of diffusion.  
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4.0 Case Study 
In this section, the increase of solar on the distribution grid in Vermont and the adoption of PV by 
the IOU GMP is investigated in order to evaluate the research questions posited in section 3.1. 
 
4.1 Background: Green Mountain Power and Vermont Electric Power Company 
Vermont’s electricity sector is represented by more than 20 utilities boasting the lowest wholesale 
electricity costs in New England, meanwhile touting an advanced transmission grid with the 
lowest carbon footprint in the country. By virtue in part of the decommissioning of a nuclear power 
plant on which the state was heavily reliant (73.7%), Vermont is transitioning away from nuclear 
power [89]. Electricity generation within the boundaries of the State is heavily reliant on multiple 
hydroelectric facilities. The State also imports a significant amount of its electricity. The amount of 
solar energy on the Vermont grid was insignificant until around 2009-2010, when the installed 
capacity starting increasing rapidly. Contributing factors to the increase include policy (renewable 
energy Standards, net metering requirements, incentives to adopt, etc.), and installed cost.  
 
Well known for its culture of independence and self-reliance, part of the rationale for promoting 
the transition of Vermont’s energy system was to make the grid more robust with greater 
distributed production. Almost 20 years ago Vermont policymakers set about encouraging growth 
in the nascent solar energy market through the introduction of a robust net metering program 
combined with incentives. These policies led to considerable growth in the installed capacity of 
renewables in GMP, the state’s largest utility, by 1,300% since 2013 in GMP. According to GMP, 
solar now accounts for almost 30% of all distributed capacity on their grid, “ranking Vermont 
second only to Hawaii.” This figure contrasts sharply to the Northeast ISO which includes 
Vermont, and has a solar penetration of only 8.4% of peak overall [87]. The increase in solar on 
the Vermont grid, along with the other sources in the energy generation mix, can be visualized in 
the Figure 8 below. Note that unlike other states in the Northeast, Vermont includes Canadian 
hydropower in its renewable portfolio [90]. 
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Figure 8: Vermont Electricity Generation by Source [109] 
The Vermont legislature passed enabling legislation coined SPEED (Sustainably Priced Energy 
Development), which increased the development of solar energy in state in part because it 
allowed the sale of renewable energy certificates (RECs) out of state. In 2014, Vermont’s electric 
utilities were earning about $50 million annually through the sales of RECs [90]. That same year, 
Connecticut prohibited the purchase of RECs from Vermont, alleging that the renewable 
attributes were being sold, while the renewable attributes also counted towards the State’s goals 
of meeting their RPS [90].  
 
Figure 9 demonstrates the expansion in installed PV capacity in Vermont, compared to the cost 
per Watt. Throughout this entire time period, the cost per watt of installed solar energy systems 
decreased sharply, from over $8/W in 2009 down to around $3.50/W in 2017.  
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Figure 9: Vermont installed solar, compared to Cost per Watt [91-93] 
4.2 Research Question Evaluation 
The economics of adopting solar energy have improved significantly over the past decade as 
installed costs fell dramatically. This has occurred due to technology advancements, a decrease 
in equipment and installation costs as competition grew and supplies became widely available, 
financial incentives, and improvements in installation techniques. 
 
The case study of GMP was examined to evaluate the validity of the research question posited in 
section 3. Evidence is provided below.  
 
Research Question 1 
1. Can natural monopolies be effective in promoting sustainable innovations? 
Studies argue that the reasons to the slow renewable energy adoption worldwide are either the 
absence of suitable policies or the absence of finance mechanisms [83]. The success of policies 
depends on the marketplace design. According to Nesta et al. in 2014, competitive marketplaces 
are more conducive for enacting successful renewable energy policies [91]. A study by Carley 
concluded that competitive electricity markets in deregulated states encourage development of 
renewable energy, since they demonstrate greater rates of renewable energy deployment, albeit 
lower percentages of renewably generated electricity [78]. 
 
Solar electricity is a sustainable innovation that has been experiencing rapid growth over the last 
decade. Still, framed in terms of Rogers’ bell curve, the U.S. is nationally at the innovator stage 
[16], as it comprised merely 1.16% of the total electric grid generation mix in 2017 [82]. 
Incorporation of solar into the electricity generation mix varies significantly state to state, with a 
few states in the Early Adopter to Early Majority phase [16], for example in 2017 comprising 16% 
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of California’s electric grid, 11% of Hawaii’s, 6% of Arizona’s. Nationwide, there is a negligible 
amount of solar generation in thirty-eight states, accounting for less than 1% of the generation 
mix. While many of these states have an RPS for increasing solar penetration on their grids, 
penetration is increasing slowly in a majority of states and significant growth is focused in a few 
[92] [93].  
 
Growth in the solar industry has been significantly driven by IPPs, which own the vast majority of 
all renewable energy generation currently on the U.S. electric grid, providing the estimated 80% of 
total funds required to do so, despite many of the IPPs having a history in the fossil fuel industry 
[83]. Growth of IPP-owned renewable energy in a given utility service territory is more likely to be 
motivated by available incentives or requirements driven by policy, which would facilitate IPP asset 
ownership, as opposed to promotion by the utility monopoly. 
 
While PURPA paved the way for IPP roll-out of distributed generation, requiring the transmission 
and distribution operators to allow the wheeling of energy over their grid, utilities often put 
obstacles in the path of IPPs, making it difficult or impossible to actually realize proposed projects. 
Obstacles may kill projects. Large-scale projects can be met with lengthy interconnection 
schedules or unusual utility requirements. Utilities deploy tactics like increasing costs for solar 
energy systems by charging more for electricity used during peak hours, not allowing certain bill 
charges to be bypassed, adding a monthly fee for providing access to the grid, and increasing 
fixed monthly charges. Utilities also lobby for rules through the PUC or elsewhere that favor their 
continued incumbent status and limit competition [112-113].  
 
When customers want to interconnect their solar energy system to GMP’s grid, GMP typically 
retains the associated RECs. For several years, GMP was improving its bottom line while 
diffusing sustainable innovations, when it realized a significant return by reselling RECs 
generated by solar being added to its grid by third parties. In 2014, Vermont’s electric utilities 
were earning about $50 million annually through the sales of RECs [90].  
 
Based on customer feedback, GMP initially spoke to the State Legislature in favor of the effort to 
grow renewable energy development, pioneering a solar adder to further incentivize solar, due to 
the value they perceived it held in reducing peak daytime loads, and the value it brought with 
RECs which could be resold. In 2018 however, GMP in their biennial update of the net metering 
program comments to the PUC, recommended that the incentives be reduced to prevent costs 
from climbing and because of the limited additional value that increased capacity delivers [87].  
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The report to the PUC indicates that significant solar deployment in the State has successfully 
achieved target goals of “providing clean energy to Vermonters while offsetting traditional power 
supply costs such as peak demand costs” [87]. However, it also suggests that additional solar 
energy deployments will not continue to realize the same benefits of existing systems, since the 
desired peak reduction has already been maximized. Specifically, GMP’s concerns are focused 
on larger net metered systems between 150kW and 500kW, as those are generally not directly 
offsetting a customer’s usage, but rather fed directly to the grid [87]. Further, although this was 
not mentioned in their report to the PUC, due to new regulations barring the resale of RECs to 
prevent double counting associated benefits, GMP no longer resells RECs out of state as they 
initially did [94].  
 
In Vermont’s GMP service territory, solar now accounts for almost 30% of all distributed capacity 
on their grid. This figure contrasts sharply to the Northeast ISO which includes Vermont, and has 
a solar penetration of only 8.4% of peak overall [87]. Regarding research question 1, given the 
right circumstances, natural monopolies can be effective organizations to promote sustainable 
innovations. Those conditions include regulation and financial incentives. 
 
Research Question 2 
2. For sustainable innovations that are potentially disruptive to diffuse in a natural 
monopoly market, does regulation play a critical role, as opposed to market forces?  
 
U.S. federal incentives for adopting renewable energy first appeared on the landscape in 1978 
[95]. Currently, federal incentives are in the form of tax credits, depreciation, and various grants 
and loans available through federal agencies. Tax credits are an exclusive potential benefit, as 
they require a taxable income in order to take advantage of them, ensuring that the bulk of the 
financial benefit goes to wealthy individuals and large corporate entities. In the U.S., this sort of 
policy favoritism is leading to a market controlled by a few solar power companies, significantly 
outpacing locally-owned projects [95].   
 
Subsidies impact all generation markets including fossil fuels which also receive subsidies in the 
United States. Subsidies keep the prices artificially low for electricity produced by fossil fuels. The 
Trump administration recently announced plans to bail out struggling coal and nuclear facilities 
which would add to the already significant subsidies in place [96]. Fossil fuel subsidies in the 
United States amount to over half a trillion dollars annually [83] [97].  
 
With reliability of electric supply of paramount importance to society, a truly deregulated 
marketplace seems out of the question as any hiccup in supply leads to voter demand for 
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regulatory interference. Policy makers are left with the unenviable task of attempting to regulate 
appropriately to ensure that utilities simultaneously achieve the impossible: 1. Ensure stable 
supply at 2. a low cost, while 3. protecting the environment [98].  
 
Political interests today play an integral role in guiding electricity production, transmission, and 
consumption [83]. Almost 20 years ago Vermont policymakers set about encouraging growth in 
the nascent solar energy market through the introduction of a robust net metering program 
combined with incentives. These policies led to robust growth in renewables--a 1,300% increase 
in GMP territory alone [87]. While GMP touts being customer-driven, it is unclear as to whether 
the other factors associated with the diffusion of sustainable innovation would have provided 
adequate incentive for such a significant increase in distributed generation on the grid there.  
 
 
Figure 100: Key legislation impacts on Vermont installed solar, compared to the installed Cost per 
Watt  [91-93] [102-107] 
The increase in diffusion of PV in Vermont appears to be directly correlated to regulations 
passed, as shown in Figure 11, where the green and red bars indicate years that legislation took 
effect. The Vermont legislature first established the Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise 
Development (SPEED) program in 2005 to encourage deployment of renewables [99]. When the 
feed-in tariff, net metering cap and allowable system size increases passed through the 
legislature in May 2009 and took effect September 30 of the same year [100], there was a 
noticeable increase in installed capacity through 2012 [101], when the first net metering cap was 
reached [102]. The net metering cap was increased again in 2014 [103], and the installed 
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capacity increased dramatically again until 2016, when the second net metering cap was reached 
by most utilities [104]. In 2017, new rules limiting ground-mount solar sites, encouraging roof-
mount systems, and reducing net metering compensation took effect, with the explicit purpose of 
reducing the expansion of the net metering program [105]. Note that the timeline versus installed 
capacity [101] may differ from a timeline versus permitted projects, as permitted projects will be 
grandfathered in but may not be installed until the following year [105].  
 
The figure clearly shows that cost per Watt was also decreasing at the same time [101] [106], so 
both factors appear to have had a significant impact. But each time a policy limit was met, the 
installed capacity notably decreased. It is unclear whether or not the same level of diffusion would 
have occurred there without regulation. However, the adoption levels in surrounding states 
without the same regulatory environment offer a clue: in GMP service territory, solar now 
accounts for almost 30% of all distributed capacity on their grid [107] [87]. The Northeast ISO 
serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont [108], 
and its solar penetration is only 8.4% of peak overall [87].  
 
Research Question 3 
3. Is a monopoly incumbent firm that is able to adapt and conform its business to 
strategically and actively incorporate a sustainable innovation into its existing 
competence less likely to be disrupted by such innovation? 
 
One of the reasons that utility companies are frequently cited for preventing the integration of 
renewable generation on to the grid is technological limitations and intermittent electricity supply 
due to the inability of traditional power generators to react to weather changes impacting 
fluctuations in distributed generation. With intermittent renewable power, stable forecasts of 
predictable power have been difficult, creating challenges in keeping consistent supply when 
renewables are unavailable.   
 
Vermont Electric Power Company (VELCO) is a transmission utility owned by the state’s 
distribution utilities, including GMP [89]. The GMP team understood that evolution had to occur in 
order to successfully integrate and maximize the amount of renewable energy on the grid. So 
they developed a strategic alliance with IBM, the University of Vermont, and VELCO, and 
invested in key infrastructure. This partnership led to a groundbreaking weather forecasting 
platform that facilitates grid management. This system accurately forecasts weather in Vermont 
down to 1 square kilometer, facilitating grid management by predicting available solar and wind 
resources with 90+ percent accuracy. In turn, this allows VELCO to reduce reserve power 
consumption and better manage the integration of renewables [10]. And the benefits of this 
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system are not limited to renewables grid integration--it further facilitates weather event 
preparation and response [109]. This innovative tool maximizes renewables while facilitating 
consistent delivery of energy to the end-user. 
 
This partnership resulted in a new company. None of the partners kept the new firm in-house, 
thereby allowing innovations and development to occur in the focused and reasonably unfettered 
environment. This proactive response to sustainable innovation allowed VELCO to adapt and 
incorporate it successfully [10] [109]. Tom Dunn, VELCO CEO, stated that: 
 
“Having traveled around the country, in my judgment what we are doing here is some of 
the most innovative work in the nation. … Once again Vermont demonstrates its 
collaborative ability to serve as an energy innovation workbench – this time by closely 
linking grid management, enhanced predictive weather capabilities and renewable 
energy to provide better value to our customers and Vermont.” [109]  
 
GMP is actively working to avoid the “utility death spiral”. The theory of the “utility death spiral” 
assumes that as customers deploy more energy efficient technologies and produce their own 
renewable energy onsite, they consume less utility power thereby reducing utility revenue. This in 
turn leads to higher utility electricity rates, further driving customer defection. [110] [111] [112] 
[113] Note that while local energy efficiency and renewable energy measures occur, on net the 
U.S. continues to consume an increasing amount of electricity [82]. As aforementioned, the 
amount of renewables added to the grid since 2001 is less than the increased demand for 
electricity. Data demonstrates that electricity consumption continues to grow on a nationwide 
basis, albeit perhaps not at the rate the utilities predicted.  
 
Making up for a reduction in per capita electricity consumption through increased energy 
efficiency and distributed generation deployment, GMP is helping customers convert from fuel oil 
furnaces to electric heat pumps, and incentivizing the use hot water heaters during off-peak times 
to level out the load and increase grid efficiency. And in mutually beneficial cases, GMP is helping 
remote customers go off the grid, eliminating costly line maintenance expenditures for a very 
small customer base while maintaining customers and broadening electricians’ skillsets by 
expanding into solar. These customers still pay a monthly fee for their off-grid power [88]. 
 
As shown by examples presented above, IOUs strategically incorporating sustainable innovations 
into their existing competencies are less likely to be disrupted by these innovations. By assessing 
and identifying where solar energy can be deployed for mutual advantage to themselves and their 
customers, utilities can be prepared for sustainable innovations and face less disruption.  
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Research Question 4 
4. Does the right environment/culture enable the strategic change needed for a monopoly 
incumbent firm to adopt sustainable innovations that are potentially disruptive? 
 
Obsessing over the customer in Vermont leads to different ends than it might in other regions of 
the United States. Customers there help push for the diffusion of renewable energy as a means 
to retain independence, keep local economies flourishing by recirculating dollars within 
communities as opposed to paying for power produced outside of the state, while caring for the 
rich natural environment.  
 
Indeed, the culture in Vermont may be more conducive than that of other states in contributing to 
the local increase in renewable energy generation. Burlington, VT achieved the distinction of 
being America’s first 100% all renewable energy city. Burlington achieved that goal by 2014, 
owning the means to its own all-renewable power production.  “The beautiful thing is that we do 
as a general rule to see the common good as a fundamental component of life here,” stated 
Jennifer Green, Burlington’s sustainability coordinator,  “We all have to give a little for everybody 
to get some” [114]. 
  
Significantly contributing to the current desire for energy independence and attempting to achieve 
local generation of what it consumes, Vermont’s independence has been part of its culture since 
1777. That year, Vermont proclaimed itself an autonomous republic and remained so for 14 more 
years even though during the same year, 1777, it hosted the first significant American victory 
during the Revolutionary War [115]. The first recorded instance of the Underground Railroad to 
assist fleeing slaves was in Vermont. It was the third state to grant civil unions for same-sex 
couples, and same-sex marriage was approved by the legislature as opposed to voters, in 2009. 
It is the least religious state, with just 33% of Vermonters considering themselves religious [116]. 
In Vermont politics, independent political candidates have opportunities to succeed because 
smaller political parties are not subject to elimination as they are in other states. It was the first 
state to require labeling of genetically modified foods [117].  
 
GMP is a generation and distribution utility, serving 70% of end-users in Vermont [89]. GMP was 
the first utility in the nation to become certified as a B Corporation, demonstrating its commitment 
to using economic forces to deal with ecological and community issues [88]. A “B Corporation” is 
a relatively new for-profit corporate designation which calls special attention to a commitment to 
environmental and social issues, accountability and transparency [118]. 
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While GMP is a regulated monopoly, arguably not subject to competitive advantage influences in 
the marketplace, promoting the brand as a sustainable company is important to their customer 
base and thus something they strive to be. The individuals who work at GMP share the same 
vision as their CEO [107]. 
  
Under atypical leadership for a utility, GMP is poised to embrace change. A mere seven percent 
of utility Executive Directors in the United States and Canada were women in 2015 [119]. Lacking 
any advanced, or even 4-year degree, Mary Powell holds an Associate’s degree from Keene 
State College, yet became a visionary CEO [120]. Powell has broken down reporting hierarchy, 
promoting equality and leadership throughout the organization [121]. 
  
As the culture at GMP changed over the last 10 years while Mary Powell served at the helm, the 
organization continued to innovate. As stated by Stephen Lacey: 
 
“Mary Powell has a simple mantra: ‘Culture eats strategy.’ Since taking over as CEO of 
Green Mountain Power, she’s implemented a startup culture that represents a dramatic 
departure from a traditional utility model – obsessing over the customer, mixing 
employees in order to uncover new ideas, testing out new products and reimagining the 
power delivery business model itself” [122]. 
 
GMP was listed as the most innovative company in the directory of “Most Innovative Energy 
Companies” by Fast Company in 2018 [107]. In 2019, they will continue to live up to this by 
addressing the “duck curve” happening in Vermont with the increase in electricity consumption in 
the evening and the lack of solar energy during those hours, by installing 2,000 utility 
dispatchable Tesla PowerWall devices for customers who select them [107]. 
 
Powell and her team are working to transform the company and the services they provide, while 
increasing electricity consumption. As parts of its transition to being much more customer-
focused, the company moved its headquarters from a sleek, modern glass building, to an 
approachable, much more energy efficient building located on a reclaimed brownfield. As 
opposed to many extremely complicated utility bills, GMP has further redesigned theirs to be 
accessible and user-friendly, with graphs and charts that make it easy to comprehend.  
 
“How do we lead and accelerate the customer-led revolution to DG that we want to see 
happen?”  GMP CEO Mary Powell 
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GMP has the needed environment and culture required in order to incorporate sustainable 
innovations. Focus on the customer and a visionary CEO have led changes from customer-
friendly simplification of power bills to the incorporation of energy storage. With a unique leader 
possessing a pioneering mindset, and a culture that encourages innovation, GMP has been 
winning awards for their innovation. By virtue of their location, GMP has the added advantage of 
being supported by the independent culture of Vermont. 
 
Research Question 5 
5. Is a monopoly incumbent able to recognize and pursue new market opportunities 
arising out of a sustainable innovation instead of viewing it as disruptive more likely to 
contribute to the successful diffusion of such innovation? 
 
Monopolies are challenged by adopting new strategies for conducting business [70]. Not only are 
incumbents faced with the challenge of learning from innovations in the deregulated marketplace, 
they must also unlearn strategies which relied on the former dominant paradigm [123] [124] [125]. 
An example of an electric utility that is actively pursuing new opportunities, GMP has identified 
market opportunities that will advance the company’s goals while incorporating sustainable 
innovations and contributing to their diffusion. GMP is doing this in a variety of avenues, working 
actively to deploy the most impactful sustainable innovations.  
 
One of Christensen’s tenets that incumbents must address with new technology is that their 
greatest value in the emerging market makes the technology unattractive in the incumbent 
market. Even though solar energy in the U.S. today is primarily used in grid-interactive 
applications, it started out being used in remote and off-grid markets. Being very expensive as 
compared to other electricity sources, it was unattractive in the incumbent market. Utilities would 
not deploy the technology as they saw little use for it. . Yet, GMP saw an opportunity to apply 
solar with storage considering its emerging market value.  
 
GMP has identified market opportunities that will advance the company’s goals while 
incorporating sustainable innovations and contributing to their diffusion. Specifically, they are 
converting some stranded customers from grid electricity to off-grid solar energy systems. They 
anticipate that by incorporating this strategy into their electricity service delivery model where 
small consumers require significant grid maintenance, the result will be significant savings. GMP 
conducted an evaluation of its current distribution infrastructure and noticed numerous stranded 
assets around the State of Vermont. Some of these assets made the utility suffer an economic 
loss due to maintenance required, and the modest revenue associated with the asset did not 
offset all of the maintenance and other associated expenses. In these instances, GMP is helping 
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their customers at the end of the power line to go solar with energy storage, continuing to charge 
a monthly fee for the electric service. GMP is taking the emerging market value of energy 
independence for solar and energy storage, and applying it to their own business model.  
 
Additionally, GMP will be incorporating energy storage into their utility service model in 2019, 
deploying two thousand PowerWall systems throughout their territory. Maintaining control of the 
energy storage systems will facilitate the capture of solar power and release of that power during 
peak times, allowing greater stability and increasing the amount of renewable power they are able 
to utilize [107].  
 
In 2007, a Canadian company called Gaz Metro acquired GMP. Further restructuring occurred 
during a merger between Central Vermont Public Service Corporation and GMP in 2012 when the 
former was acquired by Gaz Metro, making GMP the largest electric utility in Vermont [126] [107]. 
In 2018, Gaz Metro was rebranded as Energir. In addition to other companies in its energy 
portfolio, in March 2017, it purchased a solar energy developer and EPC called Standard Solar 
[127]. 
 
Customer input helps to guide GMP decisions. According to CEO Mary Powell, GMP customers 
wanted to be more energy independent, generating electricity in Vermont as opposed to having 
75% of their electricity imported. Providing energy that is over 60% renewable, from hydro, wind 
and solar, GMP recently also acquired 12 local hydro plants, bringing their total local hydro plant 
ownership to 44, the bulk of which are located in Vermont [88]. 
 
The business has been redefined from one that simply delivers power to one that serves 
customers and is very customer-focused. This transition is key for an industry traditionally 
focused more on assets and trading than concern for customers’ desires. Yet at GMP, CEO Mary 
Powell’s voice is recorded on their voicemail, and she assures anyone choosing to leave a 
message that they will receive a response within 24 hours. Indeed, when the author skeptically 
left a message on the voicemail, a response was received in less than 24 hours.   
 
GMP has significantly contributed to the diffusion of solar energy in Vermont, and successfully 
recognized new market opportunities arising out of the incorporation of sustainable innovations. 
For instance, GMP is transitioning costly stranded customers into off-grid renewable energy 
systems, and incorporating energy storage. GMP demonstrates that monopoly incumbents able 
to recognize and successfully pursue new market opportunities arising from sustainable 
innovations are more likely to contribute to the successful diffusion of that innovation.  
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4.3 Summary 
Through the case study of Green Mountain Power, the five research questions were investigated 
individually. Reflecting existing research which waffles with identifying the optimal level of 
competition required in order to promote innovation, for research question 1, the case study 
showed that natural monopolies can be effective organizations to promote sustainable 
innovations given the right conditions.  
 
To answer research question 2, among the many factors that contribute to the right conditions, 
regulation is the most critical one as opposed to market forces in the monopoly market. This was 
clearly shown by the actual deployed solar in GMP service territory following regulatory events 
illustrated in Figure 10. Compared to other regional utilities, GMP has 3.5 times greater solar 
penetration. While there were certainly other factors at play, including the ability of GMP to initially 
sell associated RECs to neighboring states at significant profit, policies such as increases in net 
metering caps and favorable net metering rates appear to have directly impacted diffusion. 
 
For research question 3, GMP has pursued collaboration with outside parties to resolve technical 
challenges, developed unique partnerships, established a culture of continuous improvement, 
placed an emphasis on customer service, and put an innovative leader at the helm. Recognizing 
the changing landscape for utilities, they are adapting and conforming to strategically incorporate 
sustainable innovations. 
 
Both Vermont and Green Mountain Power culture support new ideas, which are critical of the 
status quo. The Vermont culture values energy independence, and the GMP culture features 
innovative perspective and customer focus. The cultural characteristics required in order to adopt 
sustainable innovations that could be viewed as disruptive are present, which partly answers the 
research question 4.  
 
Finally, GMP has been able to recognize and pursue new market opportunities through 
embracing sustainable innovations, rather than viewing them with suspicion. In part, this has led 
them to successfully incorporate the sustainable innovations, and thereby contribute to their 
diffusion.   
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5.0 Conclusion 
Renewables will comprise an increasing proportion of worldwide electricity supply. The integration 
of these power sources into existing grids will be required in order to achieve the high levels 
forecasted. Technical hurdles can be overcome, yet will result in additional integration costs. 
These technical barriers include uncertainty, locational specificity, and variability. [128] 
 
Setting up protected spaces through policy framework, economic incentives, and so on, are 
methods used for regulation to introduce societally desirable marketplace changes. Innovations 
generating disruptions in monopolies are frequently caused by regulation, often leading to partial 
disruption and not a replacement of all technological competencies. The movement of natural 
regulated monopolies in any direction is driven by regulation. Legislation and regulation are key 
factors in getting natural monopolies to adopt sustainable innovations. In the case studies where 
monopolies changed, the change was driven by regulation. 
 
In the regulated monopoly situation, the monopoly will still be the one most likely to win provided 
they conform their business with existing competence. Therefore, understanding, articulating, and 
acting upon a firm’s core strengths is of critical importance when facing a disruption. While 
distributed generation adds electrons to the grid, it does not take the place of many existing core 
competencies in electric service delivery. As utilities move into the future electricity markets, it will 
be important to determine which core competencies will need to be sustained, and which should 
be overhauled or eliminated. The case study demonstrated clear examples of a company able to 
identify core strengths when facing a disruption, and utilize those strengths to move into a new 
technological era. 
 
Specific suggestions generated from this study for government and utility companies to diffuse 
renewable energy include:  
1. Recognize that utilities, as natural monopolies, can be effective adopters in the diffusion of 
distributed generation given the right policies and incentives; 
2. Consider regulations carefully and create the right ones to diffuse renewable energy. 
Regulation plays a critical role in the diffusion of renewable energy in the natural monopoly, as 
opposed to market forces; 
3. Utilities should evaluate their core competencies, such as wheeling electricity, electricity 
generation and distribution, and customer management, and focus on their continued 
improvement in order to prevent grid defection and the utility death spiral;  
4. Utilities should consider the industry changes which are rapidly approaching, and understand 
how they can develop a culture of adaptation and innovation to help them move forward; 
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5. Utilities can embrace innovations and evaluate ways in which they might incorporate 
renewable energy into their service delivery model, which could save resources and improve their 
bottom line.  
 
Based on literature review and through a case on a successful innovator in the U.S. utility 
industry, this work attempted to identify factors that promote sustainable innovations’ diffusion 
using the electricity generation from solar energy as the example. Unique factors impacting the 
adoption of sustainable innovations in monopoly markets such as the electric utilities were 
identified. As a result, a list of questions was generated as a checklist for utility companies that 
are interested in adopting and promoting sustainable innovations.   
 
As only one case study was selected in this nascent industry, it is not necessarily representative 
for industries in other locales or in other situations. Therefore, results may not be translatable for 
others who don’t successfully incorporate sustainable innovations. Further, this research was 
focused on investor-owned utilities. Future work might expand to examine other utility structures, 
such as municipal utilities or cooperative utilities. The size of a utility in its ability to incorporate 
sustainable innovations was also not considered, and may be a significant factor. Future work 
might also clearly identify the most important factors in increasing the diffusion of solar energy. Of 
the options, the greatest factor impacting the successful incorporation of solar energy into the 
Vermont electricity generation mix was not identified, with regulation, cost per Watt, and return on 
investment all being factors. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Trends according to OSIsoft [129] 
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Change is coming to the incumbent utility industry around the world. If utilities do not evolve, they 
could increasingly find customers cutting themselves off the grid as energy storage experiences 
technical and economic improvements. As shown in Figure 11, adoption rates of energy storage 
are anticipated to significantly increase in the very near future as the technology continues to 
evolve. Grid stability and reliable electricity supply are still very important to consumers, and 
utilities have considerable experience in supplying these. Evaluating and exploiting other key 
competences will be an important first step as their role in the market evolves. Utilities without a 
realistic plan for incorporating changes will struggle.  
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